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he modern, empirical study of political intolerance can easily be divided into two dominant eras: 
the Stouffer era and the Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus era. These periods are largely defined by 
the method of measuring political intolerance. During the Stouffer era, researchers identified the 
groups potentially subject to mass intolerance and asked respondents whether they would tolerate 
political activity by those groups. The Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus era ushered in the “least-
liked” method of assessing intolerance, an approach that allows the respondents themselves to 
specify the targets of their intolerance.  
 The basic, underlying insight of the least-liked approach is that one cannot tolerate a 
group or an idea of which one approves. Tolerance is not being measured when we ask atheists 
whether they would be willing to tolerate political activities by atheists.1 In one sense, the least-
liked approach to measuring intolerance takes individual groups and ideas out of the equation. 
Asking about groups in the least-liked approach is merely a means of getting equivalent targets 
about which tolerance questions can be asked. All groups are in effect the same (“content 
controlled”), because they all qualify as the respondents’ least-liked groups. The groups 
themselves are then, in essence, discarded.  
 There can be no doubt that the least-liked measurement approach has been an invaluable 
contribution to the tolerance literature. However, the basic assumption of the approach – that 
once the group is qualified as being a least-liked group, the group’s identity is of little 
significance – has not been subjected to much rigorous empirical analysis. Does it matter that 
                                                
1 The Stouffer approach is most useful when there is consensus in society as to where the 
threats lie, as in the United States in the 1950s and contemporary Israel today. If consensus 
exists, the least-liked approach will tend to generate the same targets of intolerance as the fixed-





Jane selects radical Muslims as her most disliked group, whereas Dick selects gay rights 
activists? Is being “least-liked” the only relevant attribute of groups that must be controlled? 
Our purpose in this chapter is to determine whether it is worthwhile to “bring groups 
back into” the study of political intolerance. We consider our approach not as an attack on the 
utility of the least-liked technology, but instead as an extension to the Sullivan, Piereson, and 
Marcus approach, one that incorporates in the analysis more information about the groups 
selected as least-liked. 
We pursue several specific empirical questions relating to the effects groups have on 
tolerance judgments. First, we test whether average levels of tolerance, as measured using the 
least-liked technique, vary by group. We might expect that they do not, because respondents are 
asked about their tolerance toward groups they rate as among their most disliked. We find 
however that average levels of political tolerance vary quite substantially across disliked groups.  
We then turn to a second question: whether the inter-group variance in tolerance remains 
once group threat is accounted for. While nominal groups are constants, via all being least-liked, 
they are also variables, via the measures of threat perceptions. Indeed, threat perceptions are 
typically found to be among the best predictors of intolerance. We find, however, that groups 
continue to account for significant additional variance in tolerance beyond that explained by 
threat, and, indeed, even beyond that explained by a fully-specified model of tolerance including 
demographics, socio-political values, evaluations of group attributes, and emotional reactions to 
the groups. The large unexplained variance of group differences in intolerance that remains in 




in political tolerance across groups may not be associated with differences across individuals 
who select one group over another, but with attributes located at the level of the group. 
In an effort to understand this stubborn inter-group variance in tolerance, we apply fixed 
effects and multilevel modeling techniques to this fully-specified model. Fixed-effects models 
allow us to focus on intra-group variance by partialling out the inter-group variance in the 
dependent variable. We find that the conventional wisdom of tolerance being a function of threat, 
dogmatism, and democratic values remains largely unperturbed, but evaluations of group 
attributes, including threat and whether groups are perceived as democratic, become a little 
weaker when we restrict our focus to their effects on intra-group variance in tolerance.  
The final question to which we turn is whether group-level attributes help explain some 
of the puzzling inter-group variation in tolerance. We obtain these group-level measures for each 
of five variables by using Heckman selection models to adjust the group averages for selection 
bias: sociotriopic and egocentric threat, group power, the extent to which groups are perceived to 
be undemocratic, and the extent to which they have a reputation for being violent. We include 
these measures in multilevel models so as to investigate whether reputations earned by groups, 
whether fairly or not, for being democratic, violent, or threatening, help explain the group-
specific differences in tolerance. We find that groups that are perceived to be undemocratic and, 
surprisingly, not very powerful, face elevated risks of being the focus of mass intolerance. At the 
same time, we do not any find a significant effect for group reputations for being threatening 
and/or violent. Thus, our analyses lead us to conclude that there is indeed utility to bringing 





The Conventional Least-Liked Technology 
Stouffer’s (1955) fixed-group measurement methodology dominated early research on political 
intolerance. In this approach, researchers pre-select a set of relatively unpopular political groups 
and all respondents are asked to state whether they would tolerate activities by these groups. 
While Stouffer’s approach has historically been quite popular and is still widely used today (e.g., 
the General Social Survey), it has also been subject to several criticisms (Sullivan et al. 1981; 
Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1979, 1982; Gibson 1992).  
Conceptually, to tolerate is generally defined as “to put up with that with which one 
disagrees” (Gibson 2006: 22). Thus, measuring tolerance requires an objection precondition in 
its operationalization since one can only tolerate extending political rights to groups with 
interests and ideas that one opposes. To the extent that Stouffer’s question format includes 
people who do not oppose the interests and ideas of the pre-selected groups, responses to the 
tolerance items do not capture the concept of tolerance.  
 In view of such empirical and conceptual difficulties, Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 
(1979, 1982) and Sullivan et al. (1981) proposed in their path-breaking work an alternative 
approach: the least-liked measurement technology, a “content-controlled” measure of an 
individual’s tolerance. This approach works in two steps. In the first step, researchers provide 
respondents with a list of relatively unpopular groups from varying ideological stances. Then, 
respondents are asked to identify a group they like the least.2 In the second step, respondents are 
                                                
2 The respondents are allowed to supplement the list of groups with any group that they 




asked to state whether they would tolerate political activities by this group. 
 The least-liked measurement technology overcomes many of the empirical difficulties of 
Stouffer’s approach. Most importantly, the “content-controlled” nature of the measurement 
means that all respondents react to the same group stimulus by effectively holding constant a 
respondent’s affect toward the group in question. Responses are, thus, conceptually equivalent: 
all respondents are being asked whether they would tolerate activities by their least-liked group. 
Therefore, this approach satisfies the objection precondition requirement, as well as offering a 
time-unbounded measure because it is unaffected by temporal changes in the salience of groups. 
 Notwithstanding these assets, measurement validity depends on the assumption that the 
groups are functionally equivalent. Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus argued that the groups 
selected should be viewed “as having an equivalent meaning for all of [the respondents], even 
though they may select different groups” (Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus 1982: 63). Thus, one 
respondent’s most disliked group is expected to be functionally equivalent to that of another, i.e., 
groups should not matter. Although this measurement technology is now widely used in research 
on tolerance, this assumption tends not to be explicitly invoked and has not been subject to 
empirical scrutiny. In this chapter, we will explore this assumption by investigating the role the 
groups selected as least-liked play in structuring political intolerance.  
 
Adding Groups to the Model 
In a recent article, Petersen et al. (2011) also argue strongly that the identity of the groups used in 




particular, they argue that groups that have a reputation for being undemocratic and/or violent 
are less likely to be tolerated. They conclude from their empirical analysis that: “In general, our 
findings suggest that scholars should increasingly focus on how tolerance judgments vary across 
distinct groups and theorize about how the specific characteristics of a group influence the way 
tolerance is expressed” (2011, 595).  Their findings indicate that the Danish respondents do 
indeed tend to treat groups they perceive to be anti-democratic and violent differently from 
democratic and non-violent groups.  
We continue Petersen et al.’s line of investigation. Our strategy is as follows. First, we 
examine whether the average level of tolerance that is expressed by the respondents varies as a 
function of the group they select as disliked. Since the least-liked technique is designed to 
control for content, any significant variance in tolerance by group would indicate that there is 
unexamined inter-group variance in tolerance. Scholars have conventionally taken account of 
group characteristics in micro-level models of tolerance by including threat perceptions (e.g., 
Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982), and more recently, by including emotional reactions (e.g., 
Halperin, Canetti-Nisim, and Hirsch-Hoefler 2009; Marcus, Wood, and Theiss-Morse 1998; 
Marcus et al. 2005). Our next step is therefore to examine whether tolerance varies by group 
once we have controlled for variables, such as threat and socio-political values, which are 
included in the standard micro-level model. We then add additional perceptions of group 
attributes to the micro-level model. Finally, because OLS regression models of tolerance do not 
distinguish between intra- and intergroup variance in tolerance, we move to a multilevel linear 




Data and Measures 
The data we analyze are known as the Freedom and Tolerance Surveys (FATS). These surveys, 
conducted from 2007 through 2011, use a generally constant methodology, the same survey firm, 
and a largely invariant survey instrument, and the interviews were conducted on the telephone 
(with cell-phone sub-samples added in the 2010 and 2011 surveys). The samples were randomly 
selected from the population of phone-owners 18 years old and older (for further details see 
Appendix A).3 Because earlier analyses have shown little change within the time-period of the 
surveys (Gibson 2013), we collapse them into a single database of approximately 4,000 
respondents.  
 
Dependent Variable: Political Tolerance 
As we have noted, the least-liked approach begins by querying the respondents about their 
feelings toward a variety of groups selected by the researcher, but supplemented by nominations 
from the respondents themselves.4 Table 1 reports the descriptive results from the FATS data. 
[PLACE TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 According to these data, the Ku Klux Klan is the most disliked among these groups, with 
more than two-thirds of the respondents naming members of the Klan as most or third-most 
disliked (see below). Still, other groups are highly disliked: a majority of Americans feel very 
                                                
3The AAPOR Response Rates #3 are 29.5, 30.5, 30.5, 30.9, and 29.6 percent, for the 
2007 through 2011 surveys, respectively.  
4 We are aware of no research about how the initial list of groups given to the 
respondents might frame the selection of groups for the tolerance questions. Our objective in 
constructing the list was merely to provide people of vastly different ideological stripes an 




cold toward militarists, atheists, radical Muslims, and U.S. Communists. Only a single group – 
conservatives – attract a mean feeling thermometer score warmer than the mid-point on the one 
hundred  and one-point scale.  
 Originally, Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus focused primarily on asking tolerance 
questions about the most disliked group. Others, however, have expanded the questioning by 
asking about other highly disliked groups (e.g., Gibson and Gouws 2003). In the case of the 
FATS surveys, the respondents were randomly assigned to be asked the tolerance questions 
about their most disliked group or their third most disliked group. The logic of this approach is 
that greater variability is introduced by asking about less extreme but still highly disliked groups, 
even if this requires that the status of the group be controlled in subsequent analyses. 
 In the FATS, the respondents were then asked about whether these groups ought to be 
allowed to give speeches, run candidates for public office, and hold public demonstrations. 
Speaking, seeking public office, and demonstrating are all rights that democracies must allow for 
all political points-of-view (e.g., Dahl 1971), so these are valid measures of political tolerance.5 
Table 2 reports the replies of these respondents. 
[PLACE TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 The American people are roughly evenly divided on whether these groups ought to be 
allowed their civil liberties. The division is closest for the most disliked group – for instance, 
                                                
5 Just as we argue that groups ought to be brought back into the study of political 
tolerance, Gibson and Bingham (1982) argued that attitudes toward activities ought to be given 
more attention as well. Pursuing their argument is beyond the scope of this chapter, although we 
measure political tolerance using items about actions involved in contesting for political power, 
eschewing, for example, conventional measures about teaching in schools (and, following 




49.4 % would allow a speech by the group, while 43.1 % would not. For the other highly disliked 
group, tolerance is more common than intolerance, although about one-third of the respondents 
would not tolerate any of the activities by this group. Limited variability in tolerance exists 
across the three activities.  
 We created a combined index of intolerance from these three indicators. The item-set has 
strong psychometric properties, with relatively high reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = .75), fairly 
strong unidimensionality (the eigenvalue of the second factor extracted in a Common Factor 
Analysis is .64), and roughly equal validity of the indicators (as shown by approximately 
equivalent factor loadings of the items on the first unrotated factor). We computed a simple 
summated index to serve as the dependent variable for our analysis. We scored the index (and all 
other variables in this analysis) to range from 0 to 1. 
 
Independent Variables 
Following convention (e.g., Gibson 2006) and earlier analyses of these data (Gibson 2013), we 
have created indices of three sub-dimensions of threat perceptions: sociotropic threat, egocentric 
threat, and perceptions of group power. Sociotropic threat was measured by two items, one 
asking whether the group is “not dangerous to society” versus “dangerous to society,” and the 
other asking to rate the group as “not dangerous to the normal lives of people” versus “dangerous 
to the normal lives of people.” Egocentric threat perceptions were also measured by two items: 
whether the group would or would not “reduce your personal political freedom,” and whether the 




power was measured with three questions: Whether the group is “likely to gain a lot of power in 
the United States” versus unlikely; whether the group is “unlikely to affect how well my family 
and I live” versus “likely to affect how well my family and I live”; and whether the group is 
“powerful” or not. The measures are positively intercorrelated (if one type of threat is perceived, 
the other types are also likely to be perceived), but not strongly so (with the bivariate correlations 
ranging from .25 to .32). Across all groups, political tolerance is correlated with sociotropic 
threat at −.26, egocentric threat at −.16, and perceived group power at −.03.  
Gibson’s analysis (2013) provides a basic model of the predictors of tolerance that we 
find useful. However, we add to that analysis a few additional variables to more fully incorporate 
group attributes into the analysis. 
 Other Perceived Attributes of the Group.  Our respondents were asked about the degree 
to which their disliked group were “not willing to follow the rules of democracy.” The groups 
vary significantly (p < .001; eta2 = .05) in their perceived commitment to democracy, with 
members of the Ku Klux Klan judged to be the least democratic. Perhaps a little surprisingly, 7 
of the 11 groups have mean scores near the mid-point of the 0 through 1 scale (.45 through .55). 
Most respondents are willing to tar their disliked group with the brush of anti-democraticness.6 
 Emotional Engagement with the Group:  Social scientists have long considered the role 
of emotion in inducing political intolerance (e.g., Kuklinski, et al. 1991; Marcus, et al. 1995; 
Marcus, Wood, and Theiss-Morse 1998), often within a simple model positing that intolerance 
flows from emotional engagement with a threatening group, whereas tolerance is a position 
                                                
6 We are entirely agnostic as to whether these groups are in fact anti-democratic and/or 




requiring cognition and relatively sophisticated thinking. Indeed, the “sober second thought” 
model (e.g., Gibson 1998) understands intolerance as an immediate, emotional reaction to a 
threatening group (especially to threatening symbols, such as the Nazi swastika), while tolerance 
results from considered thought in which competing objectives are weighed and balanced.  
We asked the respondents to rate their most disliked group or their third most disliked 
group in terms of three emotional terms: anger, hatred, and fear. Although the responses to these 
three items were moderately intercorrelated (mean correlation = .41; Cronbach’s alpha = .68), 
and strongly unidimensional, we follow previous researchers in treating anger, fear, and hatred as 
discrete emotional reactions with distinct behavioral consequences (e.g. Halperin, Canetti-Nisim, 
and Hirsch-Hoefler 2009; Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese 2007).  
 Knowing a Group Member: Many of these disliked groups are not particularly well-
known to the American people. For instance, Only 17.4 % of the respondents reported that they 
actually know a member of their disliked group; the remainder did not. The groups differ 
significantly (p < .001) in the frequency of being known to our respondents (eta2 = .18). 
Virtually no one knew a communist or a person advocating doing away with the government and 
letting the military run the country, but a large proportion claimed to know a liberal.  
 
Inter-Group Variance in Political Tolerance 
The first question we seek to answer is whether intolerance varies by the group selected by the 
respondent. Table 3 reports these results. We find that even though all respondents are asked 




the group selected. A set of group dummy variables in fact account for 12% of the variance (eta2) 
in individual-level political tolerance. The average tolerance score ranges from .72 for liberals to 
.42 for members of the Ku Klux Klan (on a scale from 0 to 1, among those who select each 
group as their disliked group). Thus, although the least-liked approach controls for respondents’ 
affect toward groups, it still results in considerable inter-group variation in tolerance.  
[PLACE TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
The standard micro-level model of tolerance does not include group as a factor, but it 
does include perceptions of group threat, along with demographics and socio-political values. 
The question to which we now turn is whether groups continue to exert an effect on tolerance 
once we have accounted for all the covariates in the standard micro-level model. Our method of 
doing so is to include a set of group dummy variables in OLS regression models of tolerance, 
progressively adding more independent variables until the effect of group becomes insignificant, 
if it ever in fact does so.  
 We begin with a simple model, including only a dummy variable indicating whether the 
respondent was asked about her or his most-disliked or third-most-disliked group. We then add 
blocks of micro-level variables in turn: the set of demographics, socio-political values, group 
evaluations, including threat, and finally, emotional reactions to the group. We then specify 
another set of five OLS regression models, identical to the first set except that we add the group 
dummy variables to each. We report the adjusted-R2 statistic for each equation in Table 4. 
[PLACE TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 




tolerance beyond that explained by the indicator for whether the group is most-disliked. Adding 
demographics to the model scarcely diminishes this proportion of variance explained by the 
group indicators. And while this proportion decreases as the tolerance model becomes more 
fleshed out, groups still account for an additional 5.1 % of the variance when included together 
with all the micro-level variables. Inter-group variance in tolerance remains, to a considerable 
degree, unexplained by threat and other factors.7  
Thus, our analysis clearly demonstrates that not all of the inter-group variance in 
tolerance can be explained by the traditional model of the etiology of intolerance, even when that 
model is supplemented with additional, theoretically-derived variables. So far, the evidence is 
that groups matter. Consequently, we turn to multilevel modeling in an effort to determine how 
much groups matter and which group attributes are of consequence. 
 
Investigating Inter-Group Variation in the Determinants of Tolerance 
It is useful to examine the micro-level model of the determinants of political tolerance more 
closely in order to assess the degree to which including group indicators, and thus removing the 
inter-group variance in tolerance, affects the influence of the predictors in the model. We specify 
two OLS regression models of tolerance: one without group intercepts, the other with. These 
correspond with the two models in the bottom row of Table 4. A comparison of the two sets of 
                                                
7 We note that this is a conservative test of the influence of the groups on tolerance, 
inasmuch as the incremental explained variance (known as the “part coefficient”) is calculated 
after the primary variables are allowed to explain all the variance they can. Any explained 
variance shared by the primary variables and the group indicators is, by this method, attributed to 




model results allows us to establish the degree to which bringing groups back in changes the 
effects of our micro-level variables. Results for these two models are reported in Table 5.  
[PLACE TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
Our models expand on the standard micro-level model through the incorporation of 
several new variables: the three indicators of emotional engagement with the group, knowing a 
group member, and evaluations of the extent to which a group is undemocratic. Knowing 
members of the disliked group increases tolerance, while perceiving the group to be 
undemocratic marginally decreases tolerance. Both of these effects are attenuated somewhat 
when the inter-group variance in tolerance is removed by incorporating group dummy variables 
in Model 2, although both effects remain significant.  
The last set of new variables, measuring varieties of emotional engagement with the 
group, also have a significant effect on levels of tolerance.8 However, contrary to the findings of 
Halperin, Canetti-Nisim, and Hirsch-Hoefler (2009), hatred does not have a stronger effect on 
intolerance than anger and fear. If anything, our results suggest that, among Americans, anger is 
the most important emotional pathway to intolerance. Fear is largely irrelevant for intolerance. 
These data provide hints that varieties of emotional reaction are promising micro-level 
determinants of intolerance – a finding that is well worth further investigation. 
The results for the other independent variables are similar to those obtained in earlier 
research (Gibson 2013). Demographics, with the exception of education (Bobo and Licari 1989), 
                                                
8 When we use an index of engagement, based on all three emotions, we find that the 
coefficient for the index is a highly significant −.16, which seems to imply that the effects of the 




are not substantively important even if occasionally significant, while socio-political values, 
particularly a preference for liberty over order and open-mindedness versus dogmatism, remain 
powerful predictors of tolerance. Including group indicators (Model 2) has little impact on the 
effects of these variables – unsurprisingly, as these are broad, not group-specific values. The 
effects of group threat, however, are somewhat reduced when the inter-group variance in 
tolerance is removed in Model 2. Although sociotropic threat is still highly significant, the 
coefficient is reduced from −.15 to −.11. The coefficient for group power is also reduced, from 
.04 to .01, and is no longer significant when group indicators are included, while the effect of 
egocentric threat remains essentially unchanged at .05, compared with .04 in Model 1. 
Thus, in sum, the micro-level model is largely unperturbed by the inclusion of group 
dummy variables. However, as we might expect, our measures of group evaluations, including 
threat, become a little weaker when we restrict our focus to their effects on intra-group variance 
in tolerance. The question to which we now turn is whether group-level measures of group 
attributes such as threat and willingness to follow democratic norms help explain some of the 
puzzling inter-group variation in tolerance. 
 
Testing a Multilevel Level Model of Group Influence 
Multilevel models are ideal for investigating inter-group variance in tolerance because such 
models are designed for data where lower-level units are nested within higher-order units (see 
Gelman and Hill 2007). In a typical application, analysts specify a geographic area, such as states 




effect modeling respondents as nested within groups (see also Ghitza and Gelman 2013). The 
dummy variable (or fixed effects) model we use in Table 5 permits us to partial out the inter-
group variance in the dependent variable. But multilevel models allow us to go further and 
investigate the effects of this between-group variance. The primary means of doing so is to 
include group-level as well as respondent-level variables in the analysis.  
 We are interested in evaluating the degree to which group attributes – group renown and 
group reputations for being threatening, powerful, and undemocratic – help explain tolerance 
toward these groups. To measure these group-level variables, we use respondent evaluations of 
the degree to which groups are seen as sociotropically and egocentrically threatening, powerful, 
undemocratic, and whether respondents know members of the group. However, we cannot 
simply take the 11 group averages for each of these five variables as constituting valid measures 
of group attributes on each of these five domains. 
Hidden in plain sight in Table 5 are two methodological problems of considerable 
significance. First, we only solicited evaluations from the sub-sample of respondents who regard 
the group as one of their most-disliked. For example, the only data we have on the degree to 
which Communists are violent is from those respondents who dislike Communists a great deal. 
These respondents are a small subset of the whole sample, and, more troublingly, are a subset 
selected based on their dislike of the group in question. Another way of putting this problem is 
that respondents are assigned to groups through a non-random process. Moreover, we suspect 
that the mechanism through which people selected their highly-disliked groups is correlated with 




are the attributes we would like to measure and use in the multilevel modeling.  
Second, these group evaluations are presumed to be causes of intolerance in this analysis. 
However, it is easy to imagine that group assessments are post-hoc rationalizations for 
respondents’ own intolerance, which is to say that the assessments are endogenous to 
intolerance. For example, a socially acceptable justification for intolerance is that the group does 
not play by the rules of the democratic game. We suspect that people hold many beliefs about 
groups they do not tolerate, ranging from their undemocraticness to their body odor. That these 
beliefs are causes of intolerance is not likely to be true of all respondents. 
We address the first problem – non-random of selection of respondents to groups – by 
using Heckman (1976, 1979) models. This model is a standard approach within political science 
to correct for the effects of selection bias (e.g. Berinsky 1999, von Stein 2005). We will use 
Heckman models to provide average measures of group attributes adjusting for the probability 
that each respondent chooses a particular group. In the first step of this procedure, we model the 
probability that each respondent is selected into each sample using probit models for each group. 
The inverse Mills ratio, a transformation of the predicted probability of selection, is then 
included in each of the second stage linear models of the group evaluations. To obtain the 
corrected group evaluation averages, we find the mean of the fitted values for these second-stage 
linear models that is part of the multilevel model.9   
                                                
9 There are two major sources of endogeneity that may affect our estimates regarding the 
effects of group attributes on political intolerance: 1) non-random selection process, respondents 
who select different disliked groups may have different individual characteristics; and, 2) 
simultaneity, group attributes may cause intolerance toward that group, yet intolerance toward a 
group may lead to a post hoc rationalization of perceived group attributes. While we 




The Heckman correction requires that we have adequate models of the process by which 
individuals are selected or not. Fortunately, we have a good deal of data that are pertinent to this 
selection mechanism: the respondents’ affect toward each group (via a feeling thermometer), for 
all respondents and for all groups (see Table 1, above). Indeed, immediately after soliciting 
thermometer responses for all 11 groups, we asked respondents to rank their three most-disliked 
groups. We therefore expect that group selection is to some degree determined by group affect. 
We also have respondents’ demographic information and socio-political orientations, which will 
further aid in prediction. 
Heckman models are not designed to address endogeneity, the second problem we face. 
However, it seems likely that part of any reverse causal effect flows through the respondents’ 
choice of disliked group, and thus the selection process that we model and correct for. In other 
words, while intolerance towards a particular group – radical Muslims, for example – may shape 
the extent to which this group is seen as respecting democratic procedures, at least part of this 
effect manifests in the choice of radical Muslims as a highly-disliked group. By adjusting for this 
potential, our Heckman procedure helps mitigate some, although probably not all, of the adverse 
consequences of such endogeneity.  
Nevertheless, although one of our ambitions in this chapter is to test group-level 
determinants of intolerance, we note that the potential endogeneity of intolerance and group 
evaluations, the non-random assignment of respondents to groups, and – we should add – the 
                                                
observational studies, we go some distance into minimizing them by implementing the Heckman 
correction on our averages of group evaluations. See our discussion on these methodological 




small number of groups for which we have evaluations, mean that our results suggest, rather than 
demand, causal conclusions. We return to this issue in the conclusion.    
Our models include all the micro-level variables that we discuss in the previous section. 
The results of the basic multilevel model with all such variables and varying (or random) group 
intercepts are very similar to Model 2 in Table 5. Our focus here, however, is on the effects of 
group attributes on tolerance of the highly-disliked groups, and our multilevel approach allows 
us to investigate inter-group variance in tolerance through the incorporation of group-level 
variables. To the extent that the inclusion of group-level variables reduces the error variance of 
our group-level equation, the variable is accounting for some of the fairly considerable inter-
group variance in tolerance. We report the group-level error variance using the standard 
deviation of the group intercepts, with the individual-level error variance being measured using 
the residual standard deviation, a familiar quantity from OLS regression modeling.  
 We add our five group-level measures to separate multilevel linear models of tolerance, 
otherwise specified as in Table 5. We include these variables separately because, with only 11 
groups at the group level, it is inadvisable to attempt to estimate more than one additional group-
level regression coefficient. The results are shown in Table 6. We report only the coefficient 
estimates for the five group-level measures, although the full set of micro-level variables (see 
Table 5) is included in each model. 
[PLACE TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 6 reports six models: the first is the baseline micro-level model with varying group 




average sociotropic and egocentric threat; the fourth, fifth and sixth add measures of reputations 
for being powerful, violent, and undemocratic. All of these models, with the exception of the 
fifth, include the corresponding individual-level evaluation as well as the group-level measure.10  
Although it might seem confusing to incorporate the same variable at two levels of 
analysis, there is a natural interpretation to both the group- and individual-level measures, and 
thus their coefficient estimates. The group-level measures capture the variance in the attribute 
(e.g., undemocratic, threatening to society) that is particular to that group. They can be thought 
of as measuring the reputations earned (whether fairly or not) by each group. The larger the 
sample offering an evaluation of each group, the more reliable these reputational measures are. 
When included alongside the group-level reputation measures, the respondent-level variables 
measuring the individual deviations from the group averages, or the intra-group evaluations of 
each attribute.11 These intra-group evaluations are the portion of variance in group evaluations 
that remain after the group averages are subtracted. We can therefore think of these measures as 
capturing that part of group evaluations that is due to personal experience, personality, and other 
respondent-level characteristics.  
Turning to the results of our multilevel models in Table 6, we see that two of the five 
group-level measures have a significant effect on political tolerance. Groups that are seen as 
powerful (Model 4) are more tolerated, while groups that are believed to be violent (Model 5) or 
undemocratic (Model 6) are less tolerated. While perceptions that the group is undemocratic has 
                                                
10 Because the question on group violence is only answered by 1,242 respondents, we 
exclude the micro-level measure from the models.   
11 When included without the group-level reputation measures, respondent-evaluation 




a significant and similarly-signed effect at the individual level, power does not (see Model 2 in 
Table 5).12 Thus, while beliefs that a group is undemocratic reduces tolerance at both the 
individual and group levels, perceived power only affects tolerance at the group level. In 
addition, groups that are believed to be violent are less tolerated, although not significantly so. 
The positive effect of group power is unexpected, but it may simply be a spurious 
correlation produced by the covariance between group power, on the one hand, and group 
attributes such as being mainstream or conventional, on the other. It would be of interest to 
investigate this effect further, but we unfortunately cannot do so because, with only 11 groups, 
we cannot reliably include control variables in our group-level models.   
An examination of the standard deviation of the group intercepts shows how the inclusion 
of such group-level attributes can help account for the unexplained effects of groups on least-
liked tolerance: including group reputations for being undemocratic reduces this standard 
deviation from .078 in the baseline model to .066. 
Finally, although individual perceptions of sociotropic and egocentric threat are linked 
with intolerance, we do not find evidence that groups that are thought to be more threatening to 
society (Model 1) or the respondents themselves (Model 2) are less tolerated. Neither is there 
evidence that tolerance is lower toward groups thought to be violent. Instead, it seems that all 
relevant variance in the threat posed by groups is influential only at the individual level.  
In sum, the multilevel analysis has found that groups believed to be powerful and 
democratic are more tolerated at the group-level. Beliefs that a group is democratic also shows 
                                                
12 But as we see in Model 1, Table 5, power does have a positive individual effect in the 




individual-level effects on tolerance, while beliefs that a group is powerful do not. Egocentric 
and sociotropic threat only show individual-level effects. We emphasize that these results should 
be treated with caution. We only have a sample of 11 groups. Moreover, although group 
sociotropic threat and group violence are not significant, but group undemocratic is, these three 
coefficients are almost of the same magnitude. We think our analysis clearly supports the 
minimalist conclusion that between-group variance in tolerance is worth further investigation.  
 
Discussion and Concluding Comments 
This chapter has examined the effects of groups in shaping tolerance judgments. The least-liked 
measurement technology is designed to control for affect toward groups, but we find that groups 
continue to matter for political tolerance even when using least-liked measures. Average levels 
of political tolerance indeed vary substantially across disliked groups. And even in a fully-
specified micro-level model of tolerance, group indicators continue to account for significant 
additional variance. As valuable as the least-liked measurement technology is, it does not control 
for all of the variance associated with the individual group named as the target of tolerance.  
The fully-specified model reveals some additional interesting findings. First, perceived 
threat is a fundamental predictor of tolerance at the individual level. In this regard, sociotropic 
threat is one of the stronger predictors of intolerance; egocentric threat, much less so; and group 
power, not at all. Respondents’ education, open-mindedness, and a preference for liberty over 
order also exert powerful effects on tolerance. Additionally, we found that two emotional 




knowing a group member, and evaluations of the extent to which a group is undemocratic. 
To further explore the effects of groups we use fixed effect and multilevel models to 
isolate and analyze separately within- and between-group variance in tolerance. In our fixed- 
effects model, which focuses only on within-group variance, we see that measures of group 
evaluations, such as threat, group power, and knowledge of a group member show slightly 
diminished effects. Thus, although the conclusions of existing research regarding individual-
level determinants of tolerance remain substantively unperturbed, we find evidence that group-
level attributes play a significant role in tolerance judgments.  
To explore the effects of group attributes in explaining inter-group variance in tolerance, 
we turned to multilevel models. Such models allow us to examine both the intra- and inter-group 
variance in tolerance. To accomplish the latter, we use selection bias-corrected average levels of 
five evaluations as measures of group-level attributes: the extent to which each disliked group is 
seen as threatening to society and to respondents, powerful, undemocratic, and violent. Two of 
these measures have significant effects in the group-level model. Group power increases 
tolerance, while a reputation for being undemocratic decreases it. In other words, reputations 
earned (whether fairly or not) by each group for being powerful makes citizens more tolerant 
toward the group, while reputations for following the rules of democracy renders citizens less 
tolerant toward the group. These findings hold true after adjusting for both respondents’ 
characteristics (e.g., demographics, ideology) and respondents’ perceptions of the group (e.g., 
sociotropic and egocentric threat, group power, democraticness, emotional attachments to the 




individuals, do not show significant effects on political tolerance. We conclude that not only 
does political intolerance depend on respondents’ individual characteristics (e.g., whether more 
or less educated), but also on the reputations earned by the group that the respondent selects as 
his or her least liked. 
For a number of reasons, the results of these multilevel models should be read with 
caution. Our group-level measures, although corrected for selection bias, are based on data from 
small samples of respondents who answered questions about groups regarded as one of their 
most disliked. The number of groups for which we have data (N = 11) is additionally small; 
indeed, too small to reliably include any group-level controls. And furthermore, one could argue 
that evaluations of a group are endogenous to tolerance toward that group, undermining the 
ability to claim that the former cause the latter.    
Yet, we think that bringing groups back into the study of political tolerance is worthy of 
further inquiry, as there are significant practical implications. Because the least-liked technique 
asks respondents about different groups, it is not straightforward to use the resulting measures of 
tolerance to determine whether a particular public will become intolerant toward any given group 
in the future (Gibson 2013). Further investigation into group-level variance in political tolerance 
would help shed light on the kind of groups that might become victims of intolerance in future.13 
As our findings have suggested, groups that are perceived to be undemocratic, and surprisingly, 
not very powerful, are most at risk of being the focus of mass intolerance.   
                                                
13 We note that the question of whether intolerance is focused or pluralistic is separate to 
our analyses in this chapter, even if the political consequences of intolerance depend heavily on 




As useful as the least-liked technology is, it still leaves group-based variance in tolerance 
“on the table.” Perceptions of group threat, as conceptualized and operationalized to date, do not 
seem to capture all that is meaningful to people about their highly disliked groups. We hope that 
our analysis stimulates those thinking about political intolerance to think a bit harder about how 
attributes of political enemies are perceived and how those perceptions structure levels of 
intolerance.   
 Although our analysis has been unwaveringly empirical in nature, our findings, and this 
approach to bringing groups back into the study of political intolerance, has clear and quite 
important normative consequences that we cannot ignore. We (and others) contend that 
assessments of groups influence citizens’ willingness to tolerate political activities by those 
groups. For instance, some may claim that because a group is “undemocratic,” it does not 
deserve to be tolerated. But what is the source of the belief that a group is undemocratic and how 
accurate are those perceptions? Political tolerance in many polities, including the United States, 
is a socially desirable position, making “undemocratic” an easy justification for those who 
simply do not want to put up with political activity by their enemies. In order to be more 
comfortable with intolerance, some respondents no doubt deduce attributes of the group. Indeed, 
we suspect that some respondents would ascribe virtually any negative attribute to groups that 
they are unwilling to tolerate.  And even if group reputations cause tolerance, one wonders how 
these reputations are formed, and the degree to which they are grounded in empirical reality. 
How does one know, for instance, that the KKK is undemocratic? Obviously, this is not based on 




nothing more than disagreement with the assumed political position of the group. And which 
group – there are many KKK organizations in this country – and how does one know the position 
of the groups?  Many times in American political history, groups have been tarred with attributes 
that they do not objectively deserve – were American Communists in the 1940s and 1950s 
violent; and, indeed, given the diversity of “Communists” is it even clear that all “Communists” 
actually called for the violent overthrow of the U.S. government; and, if so, how does one know 
that the group plotted violence? Group reputations are often manipulated and undeserved – are 
suicide bombers sub-human, and if so does that include Kamikazee pilots in World War II – and 
they are often nothing more than the result of efforts to delegitimize political opponents.14 
Enemies that are “disloyal” or “un-American” or “violent” or “anti-democratic” need not be 
debated and discussed; civil rights workers (or anti-apartheid activists) are most easily dismissed 
and discarded if they are labelled “Communists.”  
We therefore reiterate that nothing in our analysis is meant to accept “un-democratic” or 
even “violent” as a justification for intolerance, and nothing in our analysis demonstrates that 
beliefs about these groups are rational and deserved. And we leave for another day empirical 
research into the question of how citizens develop their stereotypes about groups with which they 
disagree.    
                                                
14 For an excellent example of how elites seek to manipulate public opinion by presenting 
their opponents as “undemocratic” (e.g., communists) when the true bone of contention is 
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Mean Std.	Dev. N 
       
Conservatives 7.0 53.8 22.9 4,084 .5 2.0 
Christian	fundamentalists 12.8 48.5 26.1 4,086 1.5 7.2 
Liberals 11.3 48.3 23.6 4,088 .8 3.9 
Gay	rights	activists 22.9 45.3 30.6 4,079 1.9 9.4 
Anti-abortion	activists 35.1 37.1 33.2 4,083 1.6 14.6 
Pro-abortion	activists 39.2 30.9 33.3 3,993 6.2 19.4 
Communists 50.4 26.1 24.7 4,086 4.8 25.9 
Radical	Muslims 56.0 20.3 23.7 4,068 14.2 39.5 
Atheists 64.9 16.9 24.7 3,690b 10.6 36.8 
Militarists 77.7 10.6 20.1 4,092 15.1 42.8 
Members	of	the	Ku	Klux	Klan 84.1 7.5 17.0 4,089 35.8 69.5 
       
 
Notes: a “Disliked Very Much” is defined as affect thermometer scores of 10 degrees or lower toward the 
group. Percentages are computed from the valid responses, which include “don’t know” responses, but 
exclude refusals to answer. The number of observations for the least-liked questions is 4,066. Groups are 
sorted in order of decreasing mean affect. 
 b The survey design in 2008 included a split ballot structure on the question about atheists, in which only 
one-half of the sample in 2008 received the same wording question as in 2007, 2009, 2010 and 2011. To 
ensure consistency in the measure, we exclude respondents who received a different wording question in 
2008. 








Table 2. Political Tolerance, Highly Disliked Groups, 2007 – 2011 
 
  Political Tolerance  
  Percentage    
  Intolerant Undecided Tolerant Mean Std. Dev. N 
        
Most Disliked Group       
 Allow Speech 43.1 7.5 49.4 3.0 1.4 2,073 
 Not Ban From Running for Office 44.2 7.9 47.8 2.9 1.4 2,067 
 Allow Rallies 47.2 9.7 43.1 2.8 1.3 2,067 
 Tolerance Index – – – 2.9 1.1 2,069 
        
Another Highly Disliked Group      
 Allow Speech 30.1 11.1 58.8 3.3 1.3 2,058 
 Not Ban From Running for Office 35.9 11.6 52.5 3.2 1.4 2,057 
 Allow Rallies 37.0 11.5 51.5 3.1 1.3 2,058 
 Tolerance Index – – – 3.2 1.1 2,059 
        
 
Notes: The percentages are calculated on the basis of collapsing the five-point Likert response set (e.g., 
“strongly support” and “support” responses are combined). The means and standard deviations are 
calculated on the uncollapsed distributions. Higher mean scores indicate more political tolerance. Note 
that the respondents were randomly assigned to be asked the tolerance questions of either their most 











Mean Std. Dev. N 
    
Liberals .72 .19 61 
Christian fundamentalists .70 .22 116 
Conservatives .70 .17 37 
Anti-abortion activists .66 .23 187 
Militarists .63 .24 702 
Atheists .56 .24 533 
Pro-abortionists activists .47 .27 239 
Gay rights activists .47 .24 126 
Communists .45 .28 359 
Radical Muslims .45 .26 589 
Members of the Ku Klux Klan .42 .28 979 
    
 
Notes: Groups are sorted in order of decreasing tolerance. The tolerance index ranges from 0 to 1, with 
high scores indicating higher levels of political tolerance. Because this analysis is based on groups 













R2 Increase With  
Group Indicators 
    
Most-disliked status only .016 .119 .103 
+ demographics .163 .253 .090 
+ socio-political values .268 .346 .078 
+ group evaluations .326 .377 .051 
+ emotional reactions .342 .393 .051 
    
 
Notes: Cell entries show the adjusted R2 statistic for OLS regression models of tolerance with the 
variables indicated in the table rows included and group indicators either included or excluded. N varies 
from 3,921 in the top row to 3,688 in the bottom. “Socio-political values” are ideology, partisan identity, 
preference for liberty over order, support for the rule of law, and open-mindedness. “Group evaluation” 
variables are sociotropic and egocentric threat, group power, perceptions that the group is undemocratic, 







Table 5: Micro-Level Models of the Etiology of Political Tolerance 
 








       
Intercept .29 (.03) *** .31 (.03) *** 
Group is most (vs. 3rd-most) disliked −.06 (.01) *** −.04 (.01) *** 
Sociotropic threat −.15 (.02) *** −.11 (.02) *** 
Egocentric threat .04 (.01) ** .05 (.01) *** 
Group power .04 (.02) * .01 (.02)  
Perception that group is undemocratic −.05 (.01) *** −.03 (.01) ** 
Anger −.07 (.01) *** −.08 (.01) *** 
Fear −.02 (.01)  −.04 (.01) ** 
Hatred −.06 (.01) *** −.05 (.01) *** 
Knows group member .08 (.01) *** .05 (.01) *** 
Liberty preferred to order .24 (.02) *** .22 (.02) *** 
Support for the rule of law .08 (.02) *** .07 (.02) ** 
Open-mindedness .26 (.02) *** .24 (.02) *** 
Ideological identity (liberal=high) .01 (.02)  .02 (.01)  
Partisan identity (Democrat=high) −.01 (.01)  −.02 (.01)  
Religious attendance −.02 (.02)  −.02 (.01)  
Born again −.02 (.01)  −.01 (.01)  
Female .06 (.01) *** .05 (.01) *** 
Level of education .16 (.01) *** .16 (.01) *** 
Owns home −.01 (.01)  −.01 (.01)  
Age .03 (.02)  .01 (.02)  
Black −.05 (.01) *** −.04 (.01) *** 
Hispanic −.04 (.01) ** −.04 (.01) ** 
       
Group dummy variables No   Yes   
Adjusted R2 .34   .39   
N respondents 3,688   3,688   
Standard deviation of residuals .22   .22   
       
 
Notes: *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05. Dependent Variable: Political Tolerance. OLS regression 
models. Model 2 adds to Model 1 dummy variables for the disliked groups.  
All variables in this analysis range from 0 through 1. See Appendix B for more information on the 




Table 6: Multilevel Linear Models of Tolerance Showing Effects of Group Attributes 
 
Group level attributes Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
       
Group threatens society (sociotropic 
threat) 
 −.13     
 (.08)     
Group threatens respondent (egocentric 
threat) 
  −.05    
  (.07)    
Group is powerful 
   .22 **   
   (.08)   
Group is violent 
    −.12   
    (.09)  
Group is undemocratic 
     −.14 * 
     (.07) 
       
Micro-level variables included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Akaike information criterion 186.7 189.3 191.6 185.2 189.9 188.3 
Std. deviation of residuals .22 .22 .22 .22 .22 .22 
Std. deviation of group intercepts .078 .071 .080 .058 .074 .066 
N respondents 3,688 3,688 3,688 3,688 3,688 3,688 
N groups 11 11 11 11 11 11 
       
 
Notes: *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05. Dependent Variable: Political Tolerance. All micro-level 
variables from Table 5 are included in these models. Cell entries are multilevel linear model coefficients 









Appendix A: Survey Details, Freedom and Tolerance Surveys  
  
All of these surveys were conducted by SRBI (SRBI/Abt). In 2007, 2008, and 2009, we used a 
standard random digit dial (RDD) design; in 2010 and 2011, the RDD sample was supplemented 
with a cell-phone sub-sample.  
 
2007 – 2009 
 These surveys are based on a nationally representative RDD sample. Conducted by 
Schulman, Ronca, and Bucuvalas Inc. (SRBI), Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing was 
used. The initial questionnaires were subjected to a formal test, and, on the basis of the results of 
the pretests, were significantly revised. Within households, the respondents were selected 
randomly. The final data sets were subjected to some relatively minor post-stratification and was 
also weighted to accommodate variability in the sizes of the respondents’ households. 
 In 2007, the interviews averaged around 25 minutes in length. The AAPOR Cooperation 
Rate #3 was 43.8% and the AAPOR Response Rate #3 was 29.5 % (see AAPOR 2004), which is 
about the average of telephone surveys these days (Holbrook, Krosnick, and Pfent 2007). 
 In 2008, the interviews average about 30 minutes. The AAPOR Cooperation Rate #3 was 
43.6% and the AAPOR Response Rate #3 was 30.5 %  
 In 2009, the interviews averaged around 37 minutes in length. The AAPOR Cooperation 
Rate #3 was 43.6% and the AAPOR Response Rate #3 was 30.5 %.  
 
2010 – 2011 
 The 2010 and 2011 surveys used a research design that combines a standard RDD 
subsample with a cell-phone only subsample. Samples were drawn from both the landline and 
cell phone national random digit dial (RDD) frames.  Persons with residential landlines were not 
screened out of the cell phone sample.  Both samples were provided by Survey Sampling 
International, LLC, according to Abt SRBI specifications.  Numbers for the landline sample were 
drawn with equal probabilities from active blocks (area code + exchange + two-digit block 
number) that contained one or more residential directory listings. The cellular sample was drawn 
through a systematic sampling from 1000-blocks dedicated to cellular service according to the 
Telcordia database. For the landline portion of the sample, the respondents were selected 
randomly within household.   
 In 2010, the interviews averaged around twenty-eight minutes in length. The overall 
AAPOR Cooperation Rate #3 was 47.6 % and the overall AAPOR Response Rate #3 was 30.9 
%.  For the RDD stratum, the AAPOR Cooperation Rate #3 was 49.1 % and the overall AAPOR 
Response Rate #3 was 30.9%. The rates within the cell-phone stratum are slightly lower: the 
AAPOR Cooperation Rate #3 was 41.6% and the overall AAPOR Response Rate #3 was 26.6%. 
 In 2011, the interviews averaged around twenty-eight minutes in length. The overall 
AAPOR Cooperation Rate #3 was 43.7% and the overall AAPOR Response Rate #3 was 29.6%. 
For the RDD stratum, the AAPOR Cooperation Rate #3 was 43.3% and the overall AAPOR 
Response Rate #3 was 30.3%. The rates within the cell-phone stratum are similar: the AAPOR 




Appendix B: The Distributions of the Variables 
 
Table B1. The Distributions of the Variables Used in the Analyses	
Variable Range Mean Std. Dev. N 
     
Political tolerance 0 à 1 .51 .28 3,688 
Sociotropic threat 0 à 1 .71 .29 3,688 
Egocentric threat 0 à 1 .69 .30 3,688 
Group power 0 à 1 .43 .27 3,688 
Perception that group is undemocratic 0 à 1 .60 .34 3,688 
Anger 0 à 1 .63 .34 3,688 
Fear 0 à 1 .47 .37 3,688 
Hatred 0 à 1 .51 .33 3,688 
Knows group member 0 à 1 .17 .38 3,688 
Liberty preferred to order 0 à 1 .60 .21 3,688 
Support for the rule of law 0 à 1 .68 .17 3,688 
Open-mindedness 0 à 1 .48 .22 3,688 
Ideological identity (liberal=high) 0 à 1 .43 .28 3,688 
Partisan identity (Democrat=high) 0 à 1 .55 .34 3,688 
Religious attendance 0 à 1 .45 .28 3,688 
Born again 0 à 1 .37 .48 3,688 
Female 0 à 1 .48 .50 3,688 
Level of education 0 à 1 .51 .30 3,688 
Owns home 0 à 1 .71 .46 3,688 
Age 0 à 1 .36 .22 3,688 
Black 0 à 1 .12 .33 3,688 
Hispanic 0 à 1 .11 .32 3,688 
Group is most (versus 3rd-most) disliked 0 à 1 .50 .50 3,688 
     
 
 
